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Abstract 
China has been the world’s second largest carbon emitter for years. Recent studies show 
that China had overtaken the U.S. as the world’s largest emitter in 2007. This has put 
China on the spotlight, just at a time when the world community starts negotiating a post-
Kyoto climate regime under the Bali Roadmap. China seems to become such a Christmas 
tree on which everybody can hang his/her complaints. This paper will first discuss 
whether such a critics is fair by examining China’s own efforts towards energy saving, 
the widespread use of renewable energy and participation in clean development 
mechanism. Next, the paper puts carbon reductions of China’s unilateral actions into 
perspective by examining whether the estimated greenhouse gas emission reduction from 
meeting the country’s national energy saving goal is achieved from China’s unilateral 
actions or mainly with support from the clean development mechanism projects. Then the 
paper discusses how far developing country commitments can go in an immediate post-
2012 climate regime, thus pointing out the direction and focus of future international 
climate negotiations. Finally, emphasizing that China needs to act as a large and 
responsible developing country and take due responsibilities and to set a good example to 
the majority of developing countries, the paper articulates what can be expected from 
China to illustrate that China can be a good partner in combating global climate change. 
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1. Introduction 
China has been the world’s second largest carbon emitter behind the U.S. for years. On 
the trends in the early 2000s, the U.S. EIA estimates that China’s CO2 emissions are not 
expected to catch up with the world’s largest carbon emitter by 2030 (EIA, 2003). This 
seems to have been implanted in people’s mind until the Chief Economist at the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) remarked in April 2007 that China will overtake the 
U.S. as the world’s largest carbon emitter in 2007 or 2008. The Chinese senior official at 
the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change immediately rebutted that 
claim, criticizing it a lack of statistical evidence (Zhang, 2007e). This early remark by the 
IEA has been incorporated into the findings of its flagship report “World Energy Outlook 
2007”, reaffirming that China is already number one in 2007 (IEA, 2007b). Other study 
even estimates that China CO2 emissions surprised those for the U.S. by 8% in 2006 
(MNP, 2007). However, China’s share of the world’s cumulative energy-related CO2 
emissions from 1900 to 2005 was only 8%, far less than 30% for the U.S. and 23% for 
European Union. While China’s share is projected to double by 2030, it is still lower than 
those for the U.S. (25%) and the EU (18%) by that time. On a per capita basis, China’s 
CO2 emissions of 3.9 tons in 2005 were only one-fifth of that for the U.S. (19.5 tons). 
While China’s emissions rise a little faster on a per capita basis than on an absolute basis, 
its emissions per head are still less than half of that of the U.S. and about the two-thirds 
those for the OECD as a whole by 2030 (IEA, 2007b). 
 
It is conceivable that China will argue that its high absolute emission levels are the 
combined effects of large population and economy and the workshop as the world, the 
latter of which leads to a hefty chunk of China’s emissions embedded in goods that are 
exported to industrialized countries. China’s arguments are legitimate. The country has 
every right to do that. However, the number one position has put China on the spotlight, 
just at a time when the world’s community starts negotiating a post-Kyoto climate regime 
under the Bali Roadmap. There are the renewed interests and debates on China’s role in 
combating global climate change. China seems to become such a Christmas tree on which 
everybody can hang his/her complaints. The question then: is it really fair to do that? 
 
This paper will first discuss whether such a critics is fair by examining China’s own 
efforts towards energy saving and pollutants cutting, the widespread use of renewable 
energy and participation in clean development mechanism. Next, the paper puts carbon 
reductions of China’s unilateral actions into perspective by examining whether the 
estimated greenhouse gas emission reduction from meeting the country’s national energy 
saving goal is achieved from China’s unilateral actions (namely, actions outside the clean 
development mechanism (CDM) projects in China) or mainly with support from the 
CDM projects. Then the paper discusses how far developing country commitments can 
go in an immediate post-2012 climate regime, thus pointing out the direction and focus of 
future international climate negotiations. While China is signaling its recognition of the 
increasing importance of climate changes issue, the paper argues that expecting China to 
take the leadership role is unrealistic. Said that, the paper emphasizes that China needs to 
act as a large and responsible developing country and take due responsibilities and to set 
a good example to the majority of developing countries. Finally, the paper articulates 
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what can be expected from China to illustrate that China can be a good partner in 
combating global climate change. 
 
 
2. Putting China’s Own Efforts towards Energy Saving and the Use of Clean Energy 
into Perspective 
 
2.1 Increasing Energy Efficiency and Cutting Pollutants 
While China has been calling for energy saving since the early 1980s, this country has set 
for the first time the goal of cutting energy use per unit of GDP by 20% in its current 
five-year economic plan. China achieved a quadrupling of its GDP with only a doubling 
of energy consumption between 1980 and 2000, as indicated in Figure 7, but since 2001 
China has experienced faster energy consumption than economic growth (Zhang, 2005). 
Clearly, this is very challenging goal in light of the recent increase in energy intensity in 
China. Given that industry consumes about 70% of the country’s total energy 
consumption (Zhang, 2003), this sector is crucial for China to meet its own set goal. This 
has led China to establish the “Top 1000 Enterprises Energy Conservation Action 
Program” in April 2006. This program covers 1008 enterprises in nine key energy-supply 
and consuming industrial subsectors. Each of them on the list consumed at least 0.18 
million tons of coal equivalent (tce) in 2004, and all together consumed 33% of the 
national total and 47% of industrial energy consumption in 2004. The program aims to 
save 100 million tce cumulatively during the period 2006-10, thus making a significant 
contribution to China’s overall goal of 20% energy intensity-improvement (NDRC, 2006). 
Empowered by the State Council, the powerful NDRC signed energy-saving 
responsibility agreements with these enterprises. To ensure the goal to be met, making 
energy efficiency improvements has been considered a criteria for job performance 
evaluations of heads of these enterprises.1 This will help them realize that they should 
take their jobs seriously because they have a very real stake in meeting energy-saving 
goals. The first-year’s results of the program’s implementation are encouraging. More 
than 95% of these enterprises appointed energy mangers, and with the energy saving of 
20 million tce in 2006, the top-1000 program is right on track to meet its 2010 target 
(NDRC and NBS, 2007). For residential buildings, China has taken the three steps to 
improve energy efficiency. The first step requires a 30% cut in energy use relative to 
typical Chinese residential buildings designed in 1980-1981. Next, China requires that 
new buildings have to be 50% more efficient by 2010. Then, the third step is to increase 
the energy-saving goal to 65% for new buildings by 2020 (Zhang, 2005 and 2008a). 
Tianjin is the first metropolitan city in China to embark on reform for heat supply and 
charge. As indicated in Table 1, by the end of 2006, 73.49 million m2 energy-efficient 
residential buildings were built in this city, accounting for 47.8% of the total residential 
buildings (Zheng and You, 2007). In Beijing, the building sector consumed 28% of its 
total energy use in 2004. By the end of 2004, 175.2 million m2 energy-efficient 
residential buildings were built in China’s capital, 37.1% of which met with the 30% 
                                                 
1 See Zhang (2007a and 2008a) for further discussion on a variety of the tactics for the 
Chinese central government to incentivize local governments and enterprises for saving 
energy and preserving the environment.  
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more energy-efficient standards and the remaining 62.9% met with the 50% more energy 
efficient standards (see Table 1). All these energy-efficient buildings in Beijing 
accounted for 65.1% of its total residential buildings. Beijing plans that all new 
residential buildings have to meet with the 65% more energy-efficient standards by 2010, 
one decade ahead of the national schedule (BMCDR, 2006).  
 
 
Table 1  Residential Buildings by Energy Efficient Standards in Beijing and Tianjin, 
China 
  
Region Non-Energy-
Efficient 
Buildings 
Energy-Efficient 
Buildings in the 
First Step 
Energy-Efficient 
Buildings in the 
Second Step 
Energy-Efficient 
Buildings in the 
Third Step 
Beijing by 
2004 
Tianjin by 
2006 
 
35% 
 
52% 
 
24% 
 
23% 
 
41% 
 
15% 
 
0% 
 
10% 
 
Sources: BMCDR (2006); Zheng and You (2007). 
 
 
In the transport sector, on March 21, 2006, the China’s Ministry of Finance and the State 
Administration of Taxation issued the joint circular enacting to adjust the existing levels 
of consumption taxes levied on a variety of products. The big adjustment has been for the 
excise tax for vehicles. The existing excise tax levied at the time of purchase was 
introduced in 1994 when China reformed its taxing system, and the rate increases with 
the size of engines, setting at 3% for cars with engines of 1.0 liter or less, 8% for cars 
with engines of more than 4 liters, and 5% for cars with engines in between. This tax 
rates for cars had since remained unchanged. The new vehicle excise tax has broadened 
the tax base from the existing range of 3-8% to 3-20%, and has broken down the size of 
engines into the six categories instead of the existing three ones. Since April 1, 2006, the 
rate for small cars with engines of 1.0 to 1.5 liters decreases to 3%, two percentage points 
lower than before. Cars with engines of 1.5 to 2.0 liters continue to enjoy a tax rate of 5%, 
and consumers who buy cars with engines of no less than 2 liters but no larger than 4 
liters are required to pay a consumption tax of 9–15%. In the meantime, the tax on cars 
with engines of larger than 4 liters more than doubles from 8% to 20% (see Table 2). To 
further rein in the production and use of gas-guzzler cars and promote the production and 
use of energy-efficient small cars, China announced on August 13, 2008 that since 
September 1, 2008, the rate for small cars with engine of 1.0 liter or less further decreases 
to 1%, whereas the rate for cars with engines of no less than 3 liters but no larger than 4 
liters goes up to 25%, 10% higher than the existing rate. Cars with engines of larger than 
4 liters are now taxed at the highest rate of 40%, 20% higher than the existing level.2 This 
                                                 
2 China lost its first-ever dispute with WTO on July 18, 2008, when a panel on the WTO 
compliance of its auto part tariffs found in favor of the complainants - Canada, the EU 
and the U.S.. China imposed in 2005 a 25% tariff on imported auto parts, if the parts 
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big upward adjustment in consumption tax for gas-guzzler cars clearly reflects that the 
Chinese government’s determination to use consumption taxation as an important 
economic instrument to promote the production and use of energy-efficient small cars 
and enhance its policy guidance on energy conservation and environmental protection. 
 
 
Table 2  Consumption Tax Rates for Cars in China 
 
Engine (liters) Excise Tax Since 1 
January 1994 (%) 
Excise Tax Since 1 
April 2006 (%) 
Excise Tax Since 1 
September 2008 (%)
1.0 or less 
1.0 < engine ≤ 1.5 
1.5 < engine ≤ 2.0 
2.0 < engine ≤ 2.5 
2.5 < engine ≤ 3.0 
3.0 < engine ≤ 4.0 
Greater than 4  
3 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
8 
3 
3 
5 
9 
12 
15 
20 
1 
3 
5 
9 
12 
25 
40 
 
Sources: Sina Net (2006); People Net (2008a). 
 
China has set even more stringent fuel economy standards for its rapidly growing 
passenger vehicle fleet than those in Australia, Canada, California and the United States, 
although they are less stringent than those in Japan and the European Union (see Figure 
1). Implemented in the two phases, the standards classify vehicles into 16 weight classes, 
covering passenger cars, SUVs and multi-purpose vans. Converted to the U.S. CAFF 
(Corporate Average Fuel Economy) test cycle, the average fuel economy standards of 
new vehicles in China are projected to reach 36.7 miles per gallon in 2008 (An and Sauer, 
2004). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
made up 60% or more of the value of a whole vehicle (Sina Net, 2008). This tariff rate 
equals the duty that China applies on imported automobiles but exceeds its 10% tariff 
ceiling on imported auto parts. China had contended that the higher tariff was necessary 
to prevent tax evasion by companies that import whole cars as spare parts and then 
assemble them together inside China to avoid the higher tariffs applicable to entire 
automobiles. However, the three complainants in the case maintained that these higher 
charges unfairly discriminate against the use of foreign auto parts and effectively 
subsidize domestic production. The complainants argued that the tariff not only 
discouraged auto manufactures in China from using the imported parts, but also that the 
higher tariff put pressure on foreign producers of auto parts to relocate manufacturing 
facilities to China. Given the fact that Chinese auto manufactures tend to produce cars 
with engines smaller than 2.5 liters and an amazing coincidence of timing (Time to 
decide to introduce this green tax is less than a month after China lost its WTO dispute), 
this big upward adjustment in consumption tax for gas-guzzler cars may be seen as a way 
for China to cut car imports without offending the WTO. 
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Figure 1  Comparison of Fuel Economy Standards for Vehicles 
Notes: Dotted lines denote proposed standards; MPG – Miles per gallon. 
Source: An and Sauer (2004). 
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China has also taken significant steps to control vehicle emissions. Following the phasing 
out of leaded gasoline nationwide in July 2000, the State Environmental Protection 
Agency (SEPA) of China requires all new light duty vehicles sold after April 2001 to 
meet State Phase I (similar to Euro I) vehicle emission standards and after July 1, 2004 to 
meet State Phase II (similar to Euro II) standards across China. Beginning July 1, 2007, 
China started implementing State Phase III (similar to Euro III) vehicle emission 
standards, with State Phase IV (similar to Euro IV) vehicle emission standards scheduled 
to be introduced on July 1, 2010 (see Table 3). Pollution from State Phase III standards is 
30% lower than that from State Phase II standards. Pollution from State Phase IV 
standards even goes down below 60% of that from State Phase II standards (Xinhua Net, 
2007b). Clearly, more stringent vehicle emission requirements by these new standards 
will help to reduce substantially the environmental stress in China. 
 
 
Table 3  Vehicle Emission Standards and the Time to Enter into Force in China, 
ASEAN and European Union 
 
 Euro I Euro II Euro III Euro IV Euro V 
European 
Union 
 
 
China 
  Beijing 
 
July 1992 
 
 
April 2001 
1999 
 
January 
1996 
 
July 1, 2004 
August 2002 
 
January 
2000 
 
July 1, 2007 
December 
 
January 
2005 
 
July 1, 2010 
1st half of  
 
September 
2009 
(proposed) 
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India 
ASEAN 
 
 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
  Philippines 
  Singapore 
 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
 
2000 
 
2005 
December 
2005 
(targeted) 
Early 2006 
Mid 2006 
Dec 2006 
2005 
 
 
July 2007 
30, 2005 
2010 
 
 
 
1st Q 2007 
 
 
 
 
Early 2005 
2008 
 
December 
2010 
(targeted) 
2012 
2010 
2010 
Oct 2006 
(Diesel) 
2010 
2012 
 
Source: Zhang (2008a). 
 
 
New vehicles that don’t comply with the new standards cannot be sold in China. Clearly, 
vehicle emission standards in China have been become increasingly stringent over time. 
While the time schedules to implement these regulations in China are a couple of years 
ahead of the schedules of India and most ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations) countries that have about the same levels of vehicle emission standards as China 
does, China still lags behind the European Union regarding the schedule of the emissions 
requirements for new vehicles. However, China’s gap with the EU requirements is 
gradually reduced from about nine yeas in 2001 to five and a half years in 2010. With the 
population of registered vehicles reaching to 148 million by the end of March 2007 in 
China (Xinhua Net, 2007b) and continuing its explosive growth, and the emissions from 
vehicles as the main source of air pollution in many Chinese cities, these cities have been 
proactive in controlling vehicle emissions. With the largest population of registered 
vehicles in China (Xinhua Net, 2005),3 Beijing took the lead. China’s capital started a 
pilot program to stop sales of leaded gasoline by July 1997, three years ahead of the 
nationwide ban, and enforces State Phase II standards two years ahead of the national 
schedule and State Phase III standards one and a half years ahead of the national schedule. 
By enforcing State Phase III standards ahead of the national schedule and speeding up the 
eliminating of existing vehicles with lower standards, total pollution from vehicles in 
Beijing is estimated to be cut by 20% by 2008, compared with the existing level of 
pollution (Xinhua Net, 2005). As commitments to the Green Olympic Games, Beijing 
introduced State Phase IV fuel standards on January 1, 2008, and required all pump 
stations to supply State Phase IV fuel by March 1, 2008. Cars with State Phase IV vehicle 
emission standards and powered by State Phase IV fuel can cut pollution in half, relative 
to cars with State Phase III vehicle emission standards and powered by State Phase III 
                                                 
3 It took 48 years for the population of registered vehicles in Beijing reached to one 
million in February 1997 from 2300 in the early 1950s. It took six and a half years to 
reach two millions in August 2003. But it took only 3 years and nine months to reach 
three millions on May 27, 2007, much quicker than what experts expected (Xinhua Net, 
2007c). 
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fuel (People Net, 2008b). China’s capital also introduced State Phase IV vehicle emission 
standards in the first half of 2008, prior to the Beijing Olympic Games on August 8, 2008 
(Xinhua Net, 2007a). 
 
2.2 The Use of Renewable Energy 
China plans to look to alternative energy sources to meet up to 16% of the nation’s 
energy needs by 2020, up from about 8% in 2006. This is a big step up from the previous 
goal of 10% by 2020. Under this ambitious government plan, China aims to have an 
installed capacity of 300 gigawatts (one gigawatt equals one million kilowatts, GW) for 
hydropower (including large hydropower), 30 GW for wind power and 30 GW for 
biopower (power generated from biomass), and produce 10 million tons of ethanol and 2 
million tons of biodiesel by 2020 (Zhang, 2007b).  
 
The European Union is widely considered to be the world’s leader in renewable energy. 
Let’s look at the EU to put China’s renewable energy goals into perspective. The EU 
aims at renewable energies meeting 12% of its primary energy by 2010 and 20% by 2020 
from its current level of 6.5% (European Commission, 2007a and 2007b). At first glance, 
the EU’s goal of tripling the share of renewable energy from the current level to 20% by 
2020 seems even more ambitious than China’s renewable energy goal. But because 
energy demand in China grows at least three times faster than EU does, doubling 
renewable energy in China’s total energy mix by 2020 requires that renewable energy in 
China grows at a rate of four times that the rate of the EU. 
 
Not only setting the ambitious renewable energy goals, more importantly China is taking 
dramatic efforts to meet the goals. China invested $12 billion in renewable energy in 
2007, which trails the leader Germany that invested $14 billion (REW 21, 2008). Given 
that the size of the Chinese economy was only slightly smaller than that of the German 
economy in 2007, this suggests that, in terms of renewable energy investment as a 
percentage of GDP, China probably scored as good as Germany. Take wind power as an 
example. In 1986, the first wind farm in Shandong Province, China, was connected with 
the electric grid. In 1995, the then Ministry of Electric Power set up the target of having 
total wind power capacity installed of 1GW by the year 2000. But by the end of 2003, the 
wind power capacity installed totaled only 0.56 GW, falling short of the target (Zhang, 
2005). China had been suffering from power shortages from 1980s and to mid-1990s, and 
was able to achieve the first time the balance between power demand and supply in 1997. 
This was considered as the unique opportunity to adjust power generation mix and to 
encourage the development of wind power. But unfortunately, the opportunity was 
passed by. 
 
The turning point for wind power development occurred in 2003. In that year, the 
government put in place a series of policies favorable to wind power development. These 
policies include value added tax for wind power being cut in half, from the normal rate of 
17% to 8.5%; low duty rate for domestic investment being levied for wind power (6%), 
in comparison with the normal rate of 23%; and duty free for equipments imported for 
renewable energy technologies in joint venture. Some local governments provide even 
favorable policies. For example, in Inner Mongolia, value-added tax of 6% is levied for 
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wind power. With these favorable policies in place, the total wind power capacity 
installed doubled between 2003 and 2005, rising to 1.26 GW in 2005. With China’s 
Renewable Law entered into force in January 2006, the pace of installation accelerated 
considerably. The total installed wind power capacity rose to 2.60 GW in 2006, with new 
installations in that year alone more than the combined total over the past 20 years. Wind 
power in China continues to expand significantly, with 3.45 GW of wind capacity 
installed in 2007. China’s 156% increase over 2006 is in sharp contrast with the world’s 
average increase of 45% (Earth Policy Institute, 2008). With 6.05 GW of total installed 
capacity at the end of 2007, China has already exceeded its goal of 5 GW in 2010. It is 
projected that the installed wind power capacity in China would top 10 GW in 2008. At 
this growth rate of new capacity installations, China would overtake India in 2008 and 
very quickly catch up with the current frontrunners in total installed wind power capacity 
(see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2  Cumulative Installed Wind Power Capacity by Country, 1980-2007 
Source: Earth Policy Institute (2008). 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Participation in Clean Development Mechanism 
The CDM is an innovative mechanism built into the Kyoto Protocol. The CDM allows 
industrialized countries to generate emission credits through investment in emission 
abatement projects in developing countries while helping developing countries to meet 
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their sustainable development objectives. While many Annex I countries have put and 
continue to put pressure on developing countries to take on emissions limitation 
commitments, the CDM so far is the only mechanism with an authentic global reach. If 
designed appropriately, the CDM could prove to be a win-win-win mechanism. First, the 
CDM could provide an opportunity for developing countries to get increased access to 
more advanced energy efficiency and pollution control technologies and additional funding 
and could thus accelerate their future development along a more sustainable path. Second, 
it will help industrialized countries to meet their Kyoto emission commitments at a lower 
overall cost than would otherwise have been the case. Third, the CDM enhances 
international cooperation in combating global climate change and thus is beneficial to the 
global environment as well (Zhang, 2000a).  
 
The implementation of CDM projects has progressed. In December 2004, only one 
project was registered with the CDM Executive Board, with another 60 in the pipeline. A 
year later those numbers were 40 and 500 respectively (Zhang, 2006c). As of September 
1, 2008, there are 1152 registered CDM projects and another 2667 CDM projects at the 
validation stage or beyond. As indicated in Figure 3, renewables are the most popular 
types of CDM projects worldwide, accounting for 63% of the total number. The 
reduction potential of all these currently known CDM projects is estimated to be 2744.7 
million tons of carbon dioxide (MtCO2) equivalents by 2012, the end of the first 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, with 28% from HFCs, PFCs and N2O 
types of CDM projects (see Figure 4). To put into perspective, this reduction potential is 
over 55% of the current total emissions in the European Union 25. Contrary to arguments 
put forth by opponents to the Kyoto Protocol, these numbers speak for themselves. 
Developing countries are indeed already participating in global efforts to cut greenhouse 
gas emissions in a meaningful way. 
 
 
Figure 3  Number of CDM Projects by Category (as of 1 September 2008) 
Source: UNEP Risoe Center (2008). 
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Figure 4  Projected CERs until 2012 by Category of CDM Projects (as of 1 
September 2008) 
Source: UNEP Risoe Center (2008). 
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Along with the growth in CDM projects are significant changes in their geographical 
distribution. Asian countries including China and India had not rushed into the CDM 
process, as they were concerned about the quality of the CDM and the integrity of the 
Kyoto Protocol (Zhang, 2006a and 2006b). Until late 2003, both China and India lagged 
behind Latin America, which made the biggest strides in the CDM and, as shown in 
Figure 5, had taken the lead in the CDM market. But, India had caught up very quickly. 
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As of late 2005, India had emerged as the leading supplier of carbon credits in the world 
(Zhang, 2006c). 
 
  
Figure 5  The Location of Project-Based Emissions Reductions Generated in 2002 – 
Q3 2003 (MtCO2 equivalent) 
Source: Lecocq and Capoor (2003). 
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China, however is another story. There were very few CDM projects in China at that time. 
With the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, however, China gradually comes to 
realize that the size of the CDM market is much smaller than originally projected and that 
the CDM market is a competitive one. This realistic expectation and the sense of urgency 
to gain real experience through learning-by-doing, combined with positive development 
in international negotiations on the rules and modalities for governing the operation of 
the CDM, have led to a positive and determined attitude of China towards the CDM 
(Zhang, 2006a). Working with a growing number of international and bilateral donors on 
many CDM capacity building projects, China gains more insight into the CDM and 
enhances its capacity to initiate and undertake CDM projects. China has also prioritized 
the areas of the CDM investment, and put in place clear institutional structure, 
streamlined and transparent CDM procedures and sound governance of clearer lines of 
responsibility and functions to facilitate the smooth implementation of CDM projects in 
the country without making a lengthy administrative and legislative procedure a 
precondition for project approval (Zhang, 2006a).  
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In the mean time, China implemented huge transactions on credits from a few large 
HFC23 projects. HFC23 is a by-product in the production of the refrigerant HCFC22. Its 
global warming potential is 11,700-times that of carbon dioxide. This means the releasing 
of one ton of HFC23 into the atmosphere is equivalent to 11,700 tons of carbon dioxide 
emissions. This significantly boosted China’s ranking. This is clearly reflected in Tables 
4 and 5 listing the top 7 host countries, based on information on CDM projects reached 
the validation stage or beyond at the two specific points of time, namely, as of 15 August 
2005 and 14 November 2005 respectively. These two tables indicate how China performs 
in comparison with other major hosting countries. During the two specific points of time, 
the number of CDM projects reached the validation stage or beyond in the world 
increases from 202 to 456, more than doubled. Although the number of CDM projects in 
China increased from 9 to 16, its share in the world’s total declined from 4.5% to 3.5%. 
The total projected amount of annual certified emission reductions (CERs) from all the 
CDM projects in the world increased from 46.6 MtCO2 equivalent to 81.6 MtCO2 
equivalent. China topped the share in the world’s total, which increased significantly 
from 2.7% to 21.7% during this period. This was largely because of huge transactions on 
credits from a few large HFC23 projects. 
 
 
Table 4  Pipeline of CDM Projects at the Validation Stage or Beyond (as of 15 
August 2005) 
 
Validated CDM projects Projected CERs Country 
Number % Amount 
(kilo tons CO2/yr) 
% 
Brazil 
India 
Mexico 
China 
Honduras 
Philippines 
Chile 
 
World 
67 
38 
11 
9 
9 
8 
7 
 
202 
33.2 
18.8 
5.4 
4.5 
4.5 
4.0 
3.5 
 
100.0 
12247 
8185 
4564 
1247 
90 
48 
367 
 
46563 
26.3 
17.6 
9.8 
2.7 
0.2 
0.1 
0.8 
 
100.0 
 
Source: Zhang (2006c) - calculated based on information on CDM projects compiled by 
the UNEP Risoe Center. 
 
 
Table 5  Pipeline of CDM Projects at the Validation Stage or Beyond (as of 14 
November 2005) 
 
Validated CDM projects Projected CERs Country 
Number % Amount 
(kilo tons CO2/yr) 
% 
India 173 37.9 16329 20.0 
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Brazil 
Mexico 
Philippines 
Chile 
China 
Honduras 
 
World 
91 
22 
20 
17 
16 
14 
 
456 
20.0 
4.8 
4.4 
3.7 
3.5 
3.1 
 
100.0 
16541 
5574 
283 
2446 
17724 
288 
 
81616 
20.3 
6.8 
0.3 
3.0 
21.7 
0.4 
 
100.0 
 
Source: Zhang (2006c) - calculated based on information on CDM projects compiled by 
the UNEP Risoe Center. 
 
However, HFC23 types of CDM projects only have climate benefits but don’t have other 
social and environmental benefits. These types of projects helped China top in the list of 
expected carbon credits, although India still leads the market in terms of number of 
projects at the same stage of development. However, they are not the prioritized types of 
CDM projects in China. Ironically, carbon credits from the so-called prioritized types of 
CDM projects only accounted for few percentages of the total carbon credits from China 
at that time (Zhang, 2006c). 
 
 
Table 6  Pipeline of CDM Projects at the Validation Stage or Beyond (as of 1 
September 2008) 
 
CDM Projects at 
Validation or beyond 
Projected Certified 
Emission Reductions by 
2012 
Region 
Number % Million 
tons CO2 
% 
Latin America 
Asia & Pacific 
   China 
   India 
Europe & Central Asia 
Africa 
Middle-East 
Total 
757 
2899 
1377 
1046 
40 
71 
3 
3819 
19.8 
75.9 
36.1 
27.4 
1.0 
1.9 
0.1 
100.0 
417.1 
2177.2 
1464.0 
417.7 
19.5 
94.4 
2.9 
2744.7 
15.2 
79.3 
53.3 
15.2 
0.7 
3.4 
0.1 
100.0 
 
Source: UNEP Risoe Center (2008). 
 
Since then, both number and type of CDM projects in China have been significantly 
changed. As indicated in Table 6, as of September 1, 2008, there are 3819 CDM projects 
that are registered, in the process of registration and at the public validation stage, with 
2899 projects (75.9% of the total number) located in Asia. As the biggest host country, 
China hosts 1377 CDM projects that are at the public validation stage or beyond, 
accounting for 36.1% of the world’s total CDM projects. These CDM projects are now 
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much broader in types than that in late 2005. In terms of number of projects, hydropower, 
wind power, and energy efficiency projects in the energy sector are the three most 
popular types of CDM projects in China. The number of CDM projects in the three types 
is 672, 235 and 226, respectively, accounting for over 82% of the total CDM projects in 
China. Their share in expected emissions reductions in China is significantly increased, 
accounting for 43% of the total estimated emissions reduction. If operated as planned, all 
these currently known CDM projects in China are projected to generate reduction of 1464 
MtCO2 equivalent by 2012, accounting for 53.3% of the world’s total estimated carbon 
credits by 2012 (UNEP Risoe Center, 2008).4 China’s share is 50% up from that three 
years ago (see Table 4). To put into perspective, this amount of the total emissions 
reductions by 2012 is more than the current greenhouse gas emissions of Germany and 
Spain combined (or that of the United Kingdom, Italy and the Netherlands combined), 
and corresponds to about 30% of the current total emissions in the European Union 25. 
India – the world’s second largest supplier of carbon credits, hosts the somewhat lower 
number of CDM projects (1040) than China does (see Table 6), but the estimated 
emissions reductions from these CDM projects in India as a share of the world’s total are 
38.1% less than those from China, meaning that the average scale of each CDM project 
in India is about 40% of that in China. Together, the two Asian giants are responsible for 
over two-thirds of the world’s expected entire emissions reductions by 2012, with China 
well positioned to be the largest supplier of carbon credits (see Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 6  Growth of Total Expected Accumulated CERs by 2012 (as of 1 September 
2008) 
Source: UNEP Risoe Center (2008). 
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4 This is very in line with the economic model-based estimates of Zhang (1999, 2000, 
2001, 2004), which show that about 60% of the total CDM flows in 2010 go to China. 
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2.4 Putting CO2 Reductions from China’s Unilateral Actions into Perspective 
If the goal of 20% energy intensity reduction in China would be met, that would translate 
into a projected reduction of its 2010 CO2 emissions by over 1320 MtCO2 (NDRC, 
2007a).5 The Top 1000 Enterprises Energy Conservation Action Program would lead to a 
cumulative CO2 reduction of 220 MtCO2 during the period 2006-2010. For comparison, 
energy-related CO2 emissions in all Annex 1 countries committed to participating in the 
Kyoto Protocol are projected to be reduced by 422 MtCO2 relative to the reference case 
in 2010 (EIA, 2006). This is just about 30% of the estimated CO2 reduction from meeting 
the aforementioned 20% energy saving goal in China. 
 
Let’s put it aside for a moment whether that energy intensity target is going to achieve. 
Assume that it will. The question then arises: is that estimated reduction achieved from 
China’s unilateral actions (namely, actions outside the CDM projects in China) or mainly 
with support from the CDM projects? As of September 1, 2008, China hosts 1377 CDM 
projects. All these currently known projects lead to annual reduction of 294 MtCO2 
equivalent. HFCs and N2O decomposition and landfill gas types of CDM projects only 
have climate benefits but do not offer energy saving and other social and environmental 
benefits to host countries. Moreover, China’s CDM regulations require that solely 
Chinese or Chinese-controlled enterprises are eligible for project development, indicating 
that the foreign company undertaking a CDM project could not be allowed to own more 
than 50% of equity in the project (Zhang, 2006a). Taking out contributions from HFCs, 
N2O, landfill gas types of CDM projects and factoring in the Chinese company owning 
more than 50% of equity in a CDM project, portion of that reduction from foreign 
investment in the CDM projects in China is estimated to only contribute about 5% of 
China’s projected CO2 reduction in 2010. This clearly indicates that CDM does not make 
much of a difference to China, but China is definitely making a difference to CDM. The 
overwhelming majority of the estimated CO2 reduction from meeting the aforementioned 
20% energy saving goal in China is expected to achieve through its own domestic actions, 
rather than support from the CDM projects. China clearly does more than what you think. 
It is unfair to criticize China without acknowledging what the country has done.   
 
 
3. How Far Can Developing Country Commitments Go in an Immediate Post-2012 
Climate Regime? 
In the meantime, China is signaling its recognition of the increasing importance of 
climate change issues. China released the National Climate Change Program on June 4, 
2007. This program is the first national program of this kind in developing countries, and 
requires to cut the country’s greenhouse gas emissions by 950 MtCO2 equivalent per year 
by 2010 (NRDC, 2007b). To fulfill that goal and better coordinate efforts and responses 
to climate change, China has reshuffled the existing National Coordination Committee on 
                                                 
5 The estimates vary. Some estimates a reduction of over 1500 MtCO2 if the goal of 20% 
energy intensity reduction in China would be met. Here I take the more conservative 
estimate from the Chinese government. 
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Climate Change (NCCCC), and elevated that minister-ranked official-led Committee into 
the National Climate Change Response Leading Group on June 12, 2007. This Group is 
now headed by Premier Wen Jiabao and includes 29 ministerial officials from 28 
ministerial agencies. This clearly reflects that China is recognizing the increasing 
importance and complex of climate change issues. This importance is further illustrated 
by incorporating strengthening adaptability to adverse effects of climate change and 
contributing to combating global climate change into the Communiqué of the 17th 
Central Committee of the ruling Chinese Communist Party in October 2007 and 
incorporating climate issues in the 11th Five-year National Environmental Protection 
Blueprint in November 2007. In China, it has been a tradition that line 
programs/blueprints are always released by line ministries/agencies. Only comprehensive 
programs are released by the State Council, China’s cabinet. The 11th Five-year National 
Environmental Protection Blueprint is for the first time released by the State Council. 
This clearly reflects the importance of environmental protection. That Blueprint also 
incorporates for the first time climate change into the category of environmental 
protection (e.g., control GHG emissions in industrial production, increase carbon sinks, 
and strengthen adaptability to climate change). Because the NDRC is in charge of the 
national development plan and national project evaluation and because climate change 
potentially has serious social and economic implications, China’s top economic planning 
agency has recognized that it needs to strengthen its role in coordinating and 
implementing national efforts towards climate change. To that end, the NDRC has 
recently reshuffled the Climate Change Office - the executive office of the NCCCC and 
affiliated with its Department of Regional Economy, and has established the Department 
of Climate Change as one of its 28 independent and functional departments (Zhang, 
2006a; NDRC, 2008a). 
  
All this raises the expectation for China’s commitments. What then can be expected from 
China? Many economic studies by Zhang (2000b and 2004) and those examined by 
Stanford University’s Energy Modeling Forum (Weyant, 1999) show that China would 
reap significant benefits from participating in a global cap-and-trade regime. Even if such 
a regime is so beneficial to China, it has been suggested for China to participate in a 
global cap-and-trade regime. However, China has consistently refusal to participate in 
international negotiations on this issue. Zhang (2007e) has examined why China has not 
embraced an international greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme from the following 
perspectives that impact upon China: a) fairness: how do developing countries perceive 
emissions caps?; b) why have China and India been skeptical about international 
emissions trading?; c) what would China’s political perceptions be on an inflow of CDM 
investment in comparison with the exports of emissions permits to the U.S.?; d) what are 
the implications of “lock  in” to an emissions cap, particularly when no rules and 
principles exist for setting emissions targets for post-2012?; and e) the complex question 
of establishing future emissions caps for developing countries.  
 
Some American analysts (e.g., Stewart and Wiener, 2003) suggest joint accession by the 
U.S. and China as a way to move beyond the Kyoto impasse. This proposal does have the 
merit of enhancing environmental effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol and helping 
stabilize the price of permits on the international market. It is certainly in the interest of 
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the U.S.. Zhang (2007c) argues that while the strengthened cooperation between the two 
largest emitters is crucial to any global efforts towards emissions reductions, joint 
accession by the U.S. and China is not in the interest of China by examining this issue 
from the following perspectives: a) how does China value importance of maintaining 
unity of the Group of 77?; b) what lessons has China learned from bilateral negotiations 
with the U.S. to work out the terms for China to get accession to the WTO?; c) what is 
the legitimacy of the U.S. insistence that it re-joins the Kyoto Protocol only if major 
developing countries join?; d) what are implications of the U.S. strikingly reversed 
position on the commitments of developing countries in New Delhi for initiating 
discussions on joint accession by the U.S. and China?; and e) how would joint accession 
by the U.S. and China be perceived?.  
 
Even if such a regime is not an option for China at the time being, what other options can 
be expected from China? To address this issue, let’s go back to international climate 
negotiations prior to Kyoto and subsequently until the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
 
Prior to Kyoto, developing counties’ demand for the U.S. to demonstrate the leadership 
and the EU proposal for a 15% cut in emissions of a basket of three greenhouse gases 
below 1990 levels by 2010 put collective pressure on the U.S., which leads the world in 
greenhouse gas emissions. At Kyoto, the U.S. had made legally binding commitments. 
The Kyoto target is seen as not enough but yet not unreasonable given that the U.S. 
economy would not be disrupted unreasonably. This may give the U.S. some “moral” 
right to persuade developing countries to take meaningful mitigation action. After Kyoto, 
the ball was kicked into China’s court. The U.S. had made it clear that bringing key 
developing countries, including China, on board had been and would continue to be its 
focus of international climate change negotiations. According to some U.S. Senators, it 
will be countries like China, India and Mexico that will decide whether the U.S. will 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol. It is therefore conceivable that the pressure will mount for 
China to make some kind of commitments at the negotiations subsequent to Buenos Aires. 
The world’s media will undoubtedly bring attention to China’s non-participation, which 
will be seen as holding up the ratification of the Protocol by the U.S. Senate and possibly 
even be blamed for “blowing up” subsequent negotiations aimed at dealing with 
developing countries’ commitments. The U.S. commitments at Kyoto and diplomatic and 
public pressure on China had put China in a very uncomfortable position. Under these 
circumstances, I envisioned a decade ago the following six proposals that could be put on 
the table as China’s plausible negotiation position, which is each described in ascending 
order of stringency (Zhang, 2000a).6 
 
“First, China could regard its active participation in CDM as “meaningful participation”. 
Second, just as Article 3.2 of the Kyoto Protocol requires Annex I countries to “have 
                                                 
6 Zhang (2000a) was originally prepared for the United Nations Development Programme 
in 1998. When the draft of that paper is ready, the Washington DC-based Resources for 
the Future made a press release titled “Is China Taking Actions to Limit Its Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions?”, September 15, 1998. 
 20
made demonstrable progress” in achieving their commitments by 2005, China could 
commit to demonstrable efforts towards slowing its greenhouse gas emissions growth at 
some point between the first commitment period and 2020. Securing the undefined 
“demonstrable progress” regarding China’s efforts is the best option that China should 
fight for at the international climate change negotiations subsequent to Buenos Aires. 
 
Third, if the above commitment is not considered “meaningful”, China could make 
voluntary commitments to specific policies and measures to limit greenhouse gas 
emissions at some point between the first commitment period and 2020. Policies and 
measures might need to be developed to explicitly demonstrate whether or not China has 
made adequate efforts. Such policies and measures might include abolishing energy 
subsidies, improving the efficiency of energy use, promoting renewable energies, and 
increasing the R&D spending on developing environmentally sound coal technologies. 
 
Fourth, China could make a voluntary commitment to total energy consumption or total 
greenhouse gas emissions per unit of GDP at some point around or beyond 2020. In my 
view, carbon intensity of the economy is preferred to energy intensity of the economy 
(i.e., total energy consumption per unit of GDP) because all the efforts towards shifting 
away from high-carbon energy are awarded by the former. 
 
The fifth option would be for China to voluntarily commit to an emissions cap on a 
particular sector at some point around or beyond 2020. Taking on such a commitment, 
although already burdensome for China, could raise the concern about the carbon leakage 
from the sector to those sectors whose emissions are not capped. 
 
This leads to the final option that China could offer: a combination of a targeted carbon 
intensity level with an emissions cap on a particular sector at some point around or 
beyond 2020. This is the bottom line: China cannot afford to go beyond it until its per 
capita income catches up with the level of middle-developed countries.” It looked like 
China would be pressured to take on commitments at much earlier date than what China 
wished. This situation has changed once the U.S. withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Anyhow, international efforts towards a post-Kyoto climate regime continues. At the Bali 
Climate Change Conference in December 2007, all governments agreed to launch a far 
reaching negotiation process to reach an agreement to the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, 
with a clear deadline for the conclusion by 2009. The carbon intensity and sectoral 
approaches-based commitments, which were discussed in the academic literature ten 
years ago, are formally incorporated into the Bali roadmap. This is a very positive 
development, and clearly indicates the policy relevance of the once-sound-theoretical 
ideas. However, given the very short timeframe to conclude the negotiations, in all 
likelihood, it would be impossible to reach the necessary agreement on the rules, 
countries and sectors covered and the levels of ambitions for developing countries, 
especially due to the amount of the data that would be required. As it has been indicated 
by the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Summit in September 2007, 
setting a carbon intensity target, even if it is not binding, is not that easy. Australia, the 
host country, proposed that all 21 APEC economies, regardless of whether they are 
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developed and developing economies, agree to reduce energy intensity by at least 25% by 
2030, but in the end the leaders only agreed to work towards achieving an APEC-wide 
(emphasis added) aspirational goal in energy intensity by at least 25% by 2030, relative 
to 2005 levels (Zhang, 2008a). This should not come as a surprise because energy use per 
unit of GDP, a key indicator of patterns of energy use, is still high in many developing 
Asian countries, and even increased in countries such as Brunei, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, South Korean and Thailand between 1990 and 2004. Indonesia and Pakistan 
consumed almost the same amount of energy per unit of GDP as they were in 1990 
(Figure 7). Even the rate of energy efficiency improvement in IEA countries has been 
less than 1% per year since 1990 – much lower than in previous decades (IEA, 2007a).  
 
 
Figure 7  Energy use per unit of GDP in the selected Asia Pacific countries, 1990-2004 
(Tons of oil equivalent/million 2000 US$). 
Source: Zhang (2008a). 
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Moreover, it is inconceivable that developing countries would ever go beyond the 
aforementioned third option between 2013 and 2020 without an effective financial 
mechanism. This is the lesson learned from the Montreal Protocol.7 The CDM under the 
Kyoto Protocol serves as a channel to provide finance and technology transfer to 
developing countries. The CDM market increased from 563 MtCO2 equivalent of CERs 
and  €3.9 billion in 2006 to 947 MtCO2 equivalent of CERs and  €12 billion in 2007 
                                                 
7 See Zhang (2008b) for further discussion on the lesson learned from the Montreal 
Protocol and its implications for multilateral trade measures in a post-2012 climate 
regime as well as whether the funds established within the climate regime can deliver as 
the Multilateral Fund under the Montreal Protocol did. 
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(Point Carbon, 2008). While the CDM has emerged as a financing mechanism to mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions as the implementation of CDM projects has progressed, it still 
does not work to full potential scale. To that end, change needs to take place both at 
national and international levels. At the national level, for those developing countries that 
have not truly benefited from the CDM, they need to put in place clear institutional 
structures, streamlined and transparent CDM procedures and sound governance of clearer 
lines of responsibility and functions to facilitate the smooth implementation of CDM 
projects in their countries. At the international level, post-Kyoto climate negotiations 
need to reform the CDM to overcome its current structural limitations and to make it 
accommodate those players and types of small projects that have been left out to date. 
When taken together and combined, they will help to expand the number and 
geographical reach of the CDM, thus spreading its benefits to more countries (Zhang, 
2008a). Nevertheless, markets cannot deliver miracles. Market instruments like CDM, as 
useful as it may be, must be complemented with traditional fund solutions that provide a 
stable source of funding.  
 
Now let’s have a look at the funds established within the climate regime. The Special 
Climate Change Fund, and the Least Developed Countries Fund are established under the 
UNFCCC. The contributions from these two funds are expected to be US$227 million a 
year (UNFCCC, 2007). The only fund under the Kyoto Protocol is the Adaptation Fund. 
The level of its funding depends on the quantity of CERs issued and their prices. 
Assuming annual sales of 300-450 million tons of CERs and a market price of US$24 per 
ton of CERs, the Adaptation Fund would receive US$80-300 million per year for the 
period 2008-2012 (UNFCCC, 2007). By contrast, according to the Stern Review (Stern, 
2007), the incremental costs of low carbon investments in developing countries are likely 
to be at least US$20-30 billion a year. This is a very conservative estimate. The 
UNFCCC (2007) Secretariat puts the investment estimates for climate change adaptation 
in developing countries in the range of 28-67 billion a year. So, the contributions from all 
these three funds only amount to less than one percent of the anticipated needs from 
developing countries. Unless this funding situation changes significantly, which is most 
unlikely to happen, developing countries cannot afford to make commitments beyond the 
third option above-envisioned a decade ago. 
 
Furthermore, the U.S. factor will continue to play a role in affecting developing country’s 
willingness to take on commitments and the stringency of that commitments. Let’s look 
at the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008 (S.3036), the most detailed 
bipartisan bill to date to require domestic, mandatory and economy-wide GHG emissions 
reductions in the U.S. beginning January 1, 2012. On June 6, 2008, the U.S. Senate 
debated and held votes on this bill. While it failed to secure the 60 votes needed to close 
debate on the bill and move to a final vote (i.e., to “invoke cloture”), the bill has made 
more headway than any of its precursors because it was the first time that a GHG cap-
and-trade bill had ever come to the floor of the U.S. Senate through regular order—that is, 
having been debated and voted out of a committee. Therefore, this Act is likely to serve 
as a template for any future bill. Under this Act, 87% of the U.S. GHG emissions are 
estimated to be subject to the emission caps that are set 19% below the 2005 level by 
2020 (Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2008). However, the U.S. GHG emissions 
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were 16.8% higher in 2005 than that in 1990 (EIA, 2007), and not all emission sources 
are capped under the Act. As a result, even if the Act becomes law, the U.S. GHG 
emissions in 2020 are probably still above its 1990 level. This is far short of a 7% 
reduction of the U.S. GHG emissions during the period 2008-2012 required by the Kyoto 
Protocol and a 25-40% cut by 2020 suggested by the IPCC and demanded by developing 
countries. In expectation that the U.S. would take on the more stringent commitments 
subsequent to the first compliance period (namely, far below its 1990 level), I envisioned 
a decade ago that developing countries may go beyond the aforementioned third option. 
However, the U.S. emissions in 2020 are at best kept at its 1990 level as estimated under 
the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act. This is far from the point where it is likely 
that developing country would do that.  
 
All this suggests that developing country commitments are most unlikely to go beyond 
the third option above-envisioned a decade ago. Rather than attempting the unrealistic 
goal, international climate negotiations may instead need to initially frame the post-2012 
developing country participation in terms of certain policies and policies as envisioned in 
the aforementioned second and third options. 
 
 
5. What Can Be Expected from China Domestically? 
The question is then whether China can take on more stringent commitments than what 
might be agreed in the ongoing post-Kyoto negotiations. Let me make the point clear at 
the outset. The U.S. has both responsibility and ability (both economical and 
technological) to take the lead, but has not done so. Until the U.S. efforts have at least 
elevated up to the point so it is viewed as a credible international partner, expecting 
China to commit internationally to specific emissions targets in the post-Kyoto 
discussions is unrealistic. In the meantime, China is anxious not to be cast as a global 
warming villain (The Economist, 2008). To show itself a good and constructive partner in 
combating global climate change, China needs to act as a large and responsible 
developing country and take due responsibilities, and to set a good example to the 
majority of developing countries, regardless of what commitments would be agreed on 
for developing countries in the ongoing post-Kyoto negotiations. 
 
In my view, the best and most realistic way for China to demonstrate its role is to make 
credible domestic commitments to energy saving and the use of clean energy. They 
include but are not limited to continuing to set energy-saving and pollutant control goals 
in the subsequent national five-year economic blueprints as challenging as the current 
11th five-year blueprint does, increasing investment in energy conservation and 
improving energy efficiency, and providing additional support policies to promote 
widespread use of renewable energies and accomplish its own ambitious renewable 
energy goals. 
 
Calling future goal as challenging as the current one requires to establish why the current 
20% energy saving goal is considered very challenging. As discussed earlier, China sets 
the goal of cutting energy use per unit of GDP by 20% by 2010. In 2006, the first year of 
this energy efficiency drive, while China reversed a rise in its energy intensity in the first 
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half of that year, the energy intensity only declined by 1.79% (revised from the originally 
reported 1.33%) over the entire year. Although this decline is for the first time since 2003, 
it is far short of the target of 4%. Among the 31 Chinese provinces or equivalent, only 
Beijing met that energy-saving goal in 2006, cutting its energy use per unit of GDP by 
5.25%, followed by Tianjin, another metropolitan city in China, with the energy intensity 
reduction of 3.98%, Shanghai by 3.71%, Zhejiang by 3.52% and Jiangsu by 3.50% (NBS 
et al., 2007).8 In 2007, despite concerted efforts towards energy saving, the country cut 
its energy intensity by 3.66% (revised from the originally reported 3.27%). There are st
big variations in energy-saving performance among the 31 Chinese provinces or 
equivalent. Beijing still took the lead, cutting its energy intensity by 6%, followed by 
Tianjin by 4.9% and Shanghai by 4.66% (NBS et al., 2008). This clearly indicated the 
Beijing’s commitments to the 2008 Green Olympic Games. In the meantime, there were 
7 provinces whose energy-saving performances were below the national average. With 
the country’s overall performance of the first two years, to meet that national energy 
intensity target would need the energy intensity reduction averaging 5.44% for each of 
the remaining three years. This required energy saving rate is even higher than the annual 
saving rate of 5.25% during the period 1980-2000 in which China achieved a quadrupling 
of its GDP while cutting its energy intensity by about three quarters (Zhang, 2003). 
Although it is not absolutely impossible to achieve that rate, it will certainly not be easy 
to do that. The country needs to further strengthen existing policies and measures towards 
energy saving. For example, China cut its total energy subsidies to around US$ 11 billion 
in 2006 (IEA, 2007b). This corresponds to a reduction of 58% compared to its 2005 level 
of around US$ 26 billion (Zhang, 2008a). On June 20, 2008, China further increased its 
producer prices of gasoline and diesel by about 20% (NDRC, 2008b). Despite this is 
encouraging, removing such subsidies is but a first step in getting the energy prices right. 
Further steps include incorporating the costs of resources themselves to reflect their 
scarcity and internalizing the costs of externalities and strengthening industrial 
restructuring to keep the frenzied expansion of highly energy-consuming, highly-
polluting and resource-intensive industries under control.  
ill 
                                                
 
Shifting control over resources and decision making to local governments and enterprises 
as the result of the economic reforms in China over the past three decades has led to 
insufficient investment in energy saving, with its share in the total investment in the 
energy industry in China declining from about 13.4% in 1983 to the level of about 3% in 
2005. China needs to increase investment in energy conservation and improving energy 
efficiency. Faced with the prospect for not meeting the ambitious energy intensity target, 
the central government embarked Yuan 10 billion in mid 2007, in addition to Yuan 11.3 
billion already allocated in early that year (the total of Yuan 21.3 billion, about US$ 3.2 
billion, or 4.5% of the total investment in the energy sector in 2005) specifically for 
energy saving, of which Yuan 9 billion to support the Ten Key Energy-saving Programs, 
13 times that of the funding support in 2006 (Yuan 0.68 billion). This is a helpful step in 
 
8 Beijing is the first provincial region in China to establish in 2006 the bulletin system to 
release data on energy use and water use per unit of GDP, quarterly releasing these and 
other indicators by county. See Zhang (2007a, 2007d and 2007f) for detailed discussion 
on why Beijing met but the country missed the energy-saving goals. 
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promoting energy conservation, but the amount of fund allocated for energy saving needs 
to further increase. To encourage local governments to eliminate outdated production 
capacities, I repeatedly called for payment of transfer both from the central government 
to provincial governments in the less developed regions and from the provincial 
governments to those cities and counties in which a large amount of outdated production 
capacities have been closed down. Moreover, the amount of that transfer needs to be 
indexed with the real energy saving as the result of closing down the production 
capacities. The Chinese government has gradually recognized the importance of the 
payment of transfer in getting local government’s cooperation. This is reflected by the 
central government’s decision in November 2007 to transfer Yuan 2 billion to provincial 
governments. This is a very positive development, but this amount of payment transfer is 
far short of the needs. It needs to further increase, in particular given that the central 
government only accounted for about 25% of the country’s total government expenditure 
but received over 50% of the total government revenue in China (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2007).9 The good news is that the Chinese government has 
recognized these needs, increasing the amount of fund allocated for energy saving to 
Yuan 41.8 billion in 2008 (including funding support for urban sewage treatment that was
allocated to Yuan 4 billion in 2007) from Yuan 23.5 billion in 2007 (The State Counci
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Table 7  Shares of the Cent
a
 
Go t Reven Gove 
rnment 
(%) 
rnments 
(%) 
rnment 
(%) 
rnments 
(%) 
Central 
Gove
Local 
Gove
Central 
Gove
Local 
Gove
1993 
1994 
22.0 
55.7 
78.0 
44.3 
28.3 
30.3 
71.7 
69.7
                                                 
9 Since the tax-sharing system was adopted in China in 1994, taxes are grouped into taxes 
collected by the central government, taxes collected by local governments, and taxes 
shared between the central and local governments. All those taxes that have steady 
sources and broad bases and are easily collected, such as consumption tax, tariffs, vehicle 
purchase tax, are assigned to the central government. VAT and income tax are split 
between the central and local governments, with 75% of VAT and 60% of income tax 
going to the central government. As a result, the central government revenue increased by 
200% in 1994 relative to its 1993 level. This led the share of the central government in 
the total government revenue to go up to 55.7% in 1994 from 22.0% in the previous year 
(see Table 7). In the meantime, the share of the central government in the total 
government expenditure just rose by 2%. By 2006, local governments only accounted for 
47.2% of the total government revenue, but their expenditure accounted for 75.3% of the 
total government expenditure in China. Objectively speaking, this improper tax-sharing 
scheme in China plays a part in driving local governments to seek higher GDP growths at 
the expense of the environment (Zhang, 2007a and 2008a). 
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1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 52.8 47.2 24.7 75.3 
52.2 
49.4 
48.9 
49.5 
51.1 
52.2 
52.4 
55.0 
54.6 
54.9 
52.3 
47.8 
50.6 
51.1 
50.5 
48.9 
47.8 
47.6 
45.0 
45.4 
45.1 
47.7 
29.2 
27.1 
27.4 
28.9 
31.5 
34.7 
30.5 
30.7 
30.1 
27.7 
25.9 
70.8 
72.9 
72.6 
71.1 
68.5 
65.3 
69.5 
69.3 
69.9 
72.3 
74.1 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2007). 
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6. Conclusions 
China overtaking the U.S. as the world’s largest carbon emitter has put China on the
spotlight, just at a time when the world community starts negotiating a post-Kyoto 
climate regime under the Bali Roadmap. China seems to become such a Christmas tree
on which everybody can hang his/her complaints. By examining China’s own efforts 
towards energy saving, the widespread use of renewable energy and participation in clean 
development mechanism, this paper shows that CDM does not make much of a diff
to China, but China is definitely making a difference to CDM. The overwhelming 
majority of the estimated CO2 reduction from meeting China’s 20% energy saving goal is 
expected to achieve through its own domestic actions, rather than support from the C
projects. China clearly does more than what you thin
w
 
To point out the direction and focus of future international climate negotiations, the pap
discusses how far developing country commitments can go in an immediate post-2012 
climate regime. The paper argues that developing country commitments are most unlikely 
to go beyond the defined polices and measures in this timeframe. On this basis
suggests that, rather than attempting the unrealistic goal, international climate 
negotiations may instead need to initially frame the post-2012 developing country
participation in terms of certain policies and policies as envisioned a decade ag
As the largest developing country, China has shown no inclination to commit 
internationally to specific emissions targets in the post-Kyoto climate discussions, at least
until the U.S. has taken binding actions. In the meantime, China is anxious not to b
as a villain. In my view, regardless of what commitments would be agreed on for 
developing countries in the ongoing post-Kyoto negotiations, the best and most r
way for China to act as a large and responsible developing country and take due 
responsibilities is to make credible domestic commitments to energy saving and the use 
of clean energy. They include but are not limited to continuing to set energy-saving 
pollutant control goals in the subsequent national five-year economic blueprints as 
challenging as the current 11th five-year blueprint does, increasing investment in energy 
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conservation and improving energy efficiency, and providing additional support polic
to promote widespread us
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e of renewable energies and accomplish its own ambitious 
newable energy goals. 
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 the win-win outcomes both for China and global climate change.  
 
nvited 
land 
g 
re
 
The paper focuses on China. However, it should be pointed out that the role of the U.S
of paramount importance to either effective China-U.S. cooperation or global efforts 
towards climate control. The U.S. has led several multilateral efforts in this area, but ha
not taken the lead in global efforts towards combating global climate change. Winston 
Churchill said that “[you] can always count on the Americans to do the right thing – aft
exhausting every other alternative.”. In my view, the U.S. leading the world in climate 
control or setting a good example for China may well be remembered as a case where 
Americans can do the right thing after exhausting at least some of the alternatives (Zhang
2007c). Maybe the next U.S. administration will tell us
h
 
In the meantime, given its very low level of GDP per capita, it is not a clear cut whether 
China has to commit to specific emissions targets until its per capita income catches up
with the level of middle-developed countries. Attempting to pressure on China on this 
may be a counterproductive way to engage China. For those who insist on this, perhaps 
the architect of China’s economic reform Deng Xiaoping’s well-acclaimed quote that “n
matter whether it’s a white cat or a black cat. It’s a good cat so long as it catches mice” 
may help to change the way of thinking. Continuing to push along that line irritates Ch
but does not do any good to combat climate change. The best strategy is to encourage
China to take on stringent domestic actions to the extent possible and appreciate the 
Chinese efforts, and at the same time to enable China to do that by providing a packag
of positive incentives in the form of support for scaling up of technology transfer 
deployment, financing and capacity building. That will accelerate China’s future 
development alone a more sustainable path. In the meantime, given coal-dominated 
energy mix in China, energy saving and the widespread use of renewable energies
that larger amount of greenhouse gas emissions will be avoided than what would 
otherwise have been the case. That helps to mitigate global climate change. After all, the 
extent to which China cuts its greenhouse gas emissions matters most to climate change, 
not the way of commitments, be they domestic or international comm
is
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